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BALANCING REPUTATION AND
FOREIGN INVESTMENT INCENTIVES:
IRELAND'S SECOND ATTEMPT AT
COMBATING THE ABUSE OF
IRISH REGISTERED
NON-RESIDENT COMPANIES
I. INTRODUCTION
Home to approximately 1,345 overseas companies conduct-
ing business world-wide, Ireland is a preferred location for
investment in Europe.' In its 1999 report, the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, an international
research organization whose membership consists of indus-
trialized, Western countries, noted that the Irish economy has
"notched up five straight years of stunning economic perfor-
mance."' The Irish government, in its 1999 Economic Review
and Outlook, points out that for the sixth successive year eco-
nomic growth in Ireland will be among the highest in the
world.3 In fact, the 1999 World Competitiveness Yearbook
ranked Ireland the eleventh most competitive economy out of
forty-seven states surveyed, placing Ireland ahead of both the
United Kingdom and Japan.4 The abuse of Irish registered
non-resident companies (IRNR), however, jeopardizes Ireland's
superior financial services reputation.5
1. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, DOING BusINEss AND INVESTING IN IRE-
LAND 1 (1999).
2. OECD, EcONOMIc SURVEY OF IRELAND (1999), available at
http'J/www.irlgov.ie/ finance/mcc416.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 1999).
3. See GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND, ECONOMIc REVIEW AND OuTLOOK (1999).
This report contains information concerning Ireland's economic developments in
1998 and forecasts for 1999 as well as a commentary regarding the challenges fac-
ing the Irish government if it is to sustain its economic success. Id.
4. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 1, at 5. A recent example of
Ireland's ability to provide the skilled people, services, infrastructure, and cost
competitive environment required to support a major global operation is the £34
million investment by Xerox Europe Limited in its Irish operations. See Xerox to
Add a Total of 600 New Jobs at Irish Operations in Dundalk and Dublin,
http://www.entemp.ielpressrel/201299.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2000).
5. See DAIL DEB. (Feb. 26, 1998), available at http://www/irlgov.ie:80/de-
bates/26feb98/sect3.htm.
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IRNRs are companies that are incorporated in Ireland but
regarded as non-resident for tax purposes.6 The advantages to
IRNRs are two-fold. First, there is no Irish tax liability for
Irish non-resident companies so long as they have no Irish
element to their operations.! Second, Irish incorporation
masks the tax haven components of these non-resident compa-
nies from their competitors.8 Therefore, it is no surprise that
many overseas investors were using IRNRs for such "undesir-
able activities" as fraud, money laundering9 and possibly drug
dealing. ° Since these non-resident companies are registered
in Ireland, their -nefarious activities reflect negatively on
Ireland's reputation as a well-regulated financial center.1 The
Irish government, seeking to protect its superior reputation,
has implemented a two-prong legislative attack on corrupt
IRNRs through its 1999 Finance Act and Companies (Amend-
ment) Act. 2 Dual reform of Ireland's tax and company laws is
the government's strategy to "weed out" 3 undesirable IRNRs
from the Irish company register while allowing multinational
corporations (MNC) to continue using IRNRs for legitimate tax
planning purposes; 4 United States MNCs in particular. 5
6. See Briefing Document attached to the Minister of State's written answer
in response to a question raised in the Dil concerning proposals to combat the
IRNR problem, reprinted in Memo on Ireland as Tax Haven, IRISH TIMES, Feb. 26,
1998, at 19.
7. See John Kilcullen, Irish Non-Resident Companies-The End?, IRISH TAX RE-
VIEW (July 1999), available at http://194.125.145.47/lpbin/lpext.dlldIT (last visited
Sept. 22, 1999). The extent of Irish tax liability consists of situations where there
may be a capital duty, stamp duty, CAT on shares or income tax on directors'
fees. Id.
8. See id.
9. DAIL DEB. (Feb. 26, 1998), available at http://www/irlgov.ie:80/debates/
26feb98/sect3.htm.
10. DAIL DEB. (Apr. 11, 2000), available at http://www/irlgov.ie:80/debates00/
llaprilsect4.htm.
11. See id.
12. See Finance Act, No. 2 (1999); Companies (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, No.
30 (1999).
13. DAIL DEB. (Feb. 26, 1998), available at http//www/irlgov.ie:80/de-
bates26feb98/sect3.htm.
14. See Minister of Finance Charlie McCreevy, Speech concerning Finance Bill
1999 Second Stage (Feb. 16, 1999), at http'/www.irlgov.ie/finance/mcc384.htm (last
visited Sept. 13, 1999).
15. See Mary Walsh, Ireland's 1999 Finance Bill Changes Corporate Residence
Rules, 18 TAX NOTES INT'L 711, 712 (1999).
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Ireland's two-prong 6 legislative attack on IRNRs is a nec-
essary and positive step towards eliminating the illegal use of
IRNRs that threatens Ireland's reputation worldwide as a
credible investment location. Equally important, this legisla-
tion reflects Ireland's transition from a "periphery"'7 Europe-
an Union (EU) country with a rural-based economy to the EU
country with the fastest growing industrial economy. By tight-
ening Ireland's tax and company laws, this legislation strives
to preserve the superior reputation Ireland has acquired
through its economic advancement, while delicately balancing
the need for Ireland's newly expanding economy to attract
foreign investment. For this reason, this legislation does not
piovide for the total elimination of IRNRs.
Part I of this Note introduced the concept of Irish regis-
tered non-resident companies: what they are, 8 what problems
they cause and what remedial legislation Ireland enacted in
1999. Part II examines Ireland's past attempts to curtail the
illegal use of these corporate forms and the factors that influ-
enced the legislature when implementing its two-prong at-
tack" on IRNRs. Factors such as the negative impact on
Ireland's reputation and that of the International Financial
Services Centre (IFSC) in particular will be explored, as well
as the influential role of European Union business directives
and multinational corporations in structuring Ireland's legisla-
tive changes. Part III analyzes the necessity of a two-prong
attack and its effectiveness in combating the IRNR problem in
addition to proposing possible future changes. Alternatives
that may prove more beneficial also will be considered. Part IV
concludes with an explanation of why Ireland's two-prong leg-
islation will secure Ireland's future attractiveness as a foreign
investment location until its economy matures enough to allow
for the elimination of IRNRs.
16. See Kilcullen, supra note 7.
17. Jessica J. Poyner, Investing in Ireland. The Enticement of U.S. High-Tech
Industry to the Emerald Isle, 10 TRANSNATfL LAW. 195, at n.62.
18. See IRISH TIMES, supra note 6.
19. See Kilcullen, supra note 7.
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II. HARBINGERS OF REFORM
A. The Urgent Need for Change
With the ever increasing abuse of IRNRs, it was only a
matter of time before the Irish government passed legislation
to prevent Ireland from being a "convenient address" for com-
panies that contribute nothing to the economy and damage
Ireland's international standing.'0 A report published by a
government appointed commission indicated that "since 1990,
Ireland has begun to rival the Cayman Islands, British Virgin
Islands, Mauritius and Liechtenstein as centers for the laun-
dering of illegal monies earned from criminal activities, includ-
ing drug trading and corporate tax evasion."21 Because these
IRNRs' only connection with Ireland was their place of incorpo-
ration, it was exceedingly difficult for the Irish government to
regulate them. Furthermore, penalties for failure to file tax
returns were ineffective because these non-resident companies
did not have assets, property, or corporate officers in Ire-
land.22
Concerns about IRNRs escalated after the United Kingdom
eliminated non-resident companies in 1988.' After this date,
Ireland quickly became a favorite European tax haven among
foreign investors. By 1998, there were up to 40,000 companies
operated in Ireland by overseas investors, mainly established
to hide money from their native country's tax authorities.'
Mafia and Eastern European crime bosses are believed to be
among the overseas investors who use IRNRs to launder mon-
ey- 5 In response to these abuses, the Minister of Finance,
Charlie McCreevy, stated in the February 26, 1998 Dil De-
bates that he deplored the message that Ireland is a "Cayman
Island type tax haven."26 Exactly one year later, in a speech
20. See Cliff Taylor, How to Cut Tax Payment by £50,000 on £250,000 Income,
IRISH TIMES, Feb. 27, 1998, at 7.
21. Government Seeks to Crack Down on Money Laundering at Exchange, 11
INTL SEC. REG. REP. 5 (1998).
22. See Walsh, supra note 15, at 711.
23. See id.
24. See Siobhan Creaton, Abuse Mars Financial Credibility, IRISH TIMES, Feb.
13, 1998, at 7.
25. See Denis Coghlan, Government to Target Money Laundering, IRISH TIMES,
Dec. 21, 1998, at C7.
26. DAIL DEB. (Feb. 26, 1998), available at http/Avww/irlgov.ie:80/debates/
26feb98lsect3.htm.
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to the Institute of Taxation, Minister of State, Martin Cullen,
said that the "need for urgent change" became evident to him
upon seeing an advertisement for the services of agents offer-
ing to set up IRNRs appearing in an Aer Lingus in-flight mag-
azine.' Such advertisements, Mr. Cullen believes convey the
"wrong impression" and damage Ireland's international stand-
ing.' The negative impact on Ireland's international reputa-
tion as a well-regulated legal and business environment, par-
ticularly for financial activities, is the Irish government's core
concern.
29
Eventually, Ireland would have been blacklisted as a tax
haven if steps were not taken to combat the illegal use of their
non-resident companies."0 Unlike traditional zero-tax or low-
tax havens, Ireland, because of its 10 percent tax rate for man-
ufacturing income and IFSC incentives, falls within the catego-
ry of tax havens that imposes tax at normal rates but grants
exemptions or preferential treatment to certain categories of
income.3' Increased use of tax havens by criminals in the drug
trade resulted in the emergence of an informal definition of
"tax haven" known as the "smell test," based on the reputation
of the country.32 According to the smell test, a country that
"looks like a tax haven to those who are potential customers"
will acquire the reputation and status of a tax haven.3 The
smell test highlights the importance of a good reputation to a
country in the global economy. The changes to Germany's tax
laws in 1998 are illustrative of the value of a country's reputa-
tion. The German tax laws were changed because the IFSC
had acquired a reputation as a tax haven. 4 These tax reforms
created "high uncertainty" among potential German investors
in the IFSC and thus a subsequent drop in German IFSC in-
27. Minister of State Martin Cullen, Taoiseach Speech to the Institute of Tax-
ation Annual Dinner (Feb. 26, 1999), at http-//www.irlgov.ie/finance/taxdinner.htm
(last visited Sept. 13, 1999).
28. Id.
29. See Walsh, supra note 15, at 711.
30. See Kilcullen, supra note 7.
31. See ADRIAN OGLEY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL TAX-A MULTINATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE 89-90 (1993).
32. Kurt A. Wagner, U.S. Taxation of Foreign Income: The Use of Tax Havens
in a Changing Tax Environment, 18 S. ILL. U. L.J. 617, 620.
33. Id.
34. See Cohm Keena, IFSC has a 'Reputation as Tax Haven," IRISH TIMES,
Dec. 14, 1998, at 20.
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vestments. In practice, the IFSC's bad reputation caused the
German authorities to go to "considerable lengths" to tax again
any profits from Ireland.35 A reputation as a tax haven, in
this case, cost Ireland and the IFSC a number of German in-
vestors and the jobs their operations would have brought to
the Irish economy.36 This example highlights why Ireland is
eager to combat the illegal use of IRNRs and to protect its
reputation as a well-regulated financial center.
B. Ireland's Attractiveness for Non-Resident Companies
Ireland acquired its reputation as a tax haven because
various factors made it an attractive location for foreign inves-
tors. Loopholes in Ireland's corporation tax laws, for instance,
allowed foreign investors to function as if they were regulated
in a "tax haven country," while Ireland's superior reputation
masked the appearance of their doing soY Furthermore, the
United Kingdom eliminated non-resident companies in 1988,
thus giving foreign investors an added incentive to set up non-
resident companies in Ireland."5 After this time, Ireland, be-
cause of its lax tax laws, European Union membership, and
worldwide reputation as a well-regulated environment for
financial services, 9 became a favored location among foreign
investors hoping to hide money from their native country's tax
authorities.
Another reason Ireland attracted foreign investors was
because setting up an IRNR was not only quick and easy but
35. Id.
36. See id. There are about 35 stand-alone German operations in the IFSC,
representing about 12 percent of the total stand-alone projects in the centre. About
half of the German operations are in the banking and fund-management area,
employing approximately 500 people. A further 50 managed operations are of Ger-
man origin, accounting for 9 percent of total managed entities." Id.
37. See Kilcullen, supra note 7; Mark Brennock, Tax Dodger, Money Launder-
er, Welcome to our Offshore Island: Want to Cut Your Tax Bill or Hide Your
Dodgy Money in Ireland, a Prestige European Location?, IRISH TIMEs, Feb. 28,
1998, at 8.
38. See DAIL DEB. (Feb. 26, 1998), available at httpj//www/irlgov.ie:80/debates/
26feb98/sect3.htm; Kilcullen, supra note 7.
39. See Coghlan, supra note 25; Carole Craig, Ireland's List of Finance Priori-
ties Includes Schedule of Rate Cuts for Corporation Tax, BNA INTIL Bus. & FIN.
DAILY, Jan. 22, 1999; Carole Craig, Ireland Finance Bill Begins Scaling Back Rate
for Corporations, Expands Benefits for Some, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Feb.
16, 1999.
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inexpensive." Conveniently, the non-resident incorporation
process also enabled beneficial owners to remain anony-
mous.4 The so-called "Sark Lark," for example, involved
Channel Islanders who would become nominee directors so
that the true identity of the beneficial owners, the foreign
investors setting up IRNRs, could be concealed." One need
only "turn to the back pages of the Economist or Time Maga-
zine" to find advertisements that attest to the simple, inexpen-
sive, and anonymous incorporation process offered to foreign
investors wishing to set up non-resident companies in Ire-
land.4" The number and content of these magazine advertise-
ments serve not only to illustrate, but also to promote the
illegal use of IRNRs that the Irish government now hopes to
eliminate with its new legislation.44
40. See Creaton, supra note 24; Brennock, supra note 37.
41. See Brennock, supra note 37.
42. Siobhan Creaton, Non-Resident Tax Law Will Not Change This Year, IRISH
TIMES, June 5, 1998, at 1.
43. Creaton, supra note 24.
Both magazines carry numerous advertisements from companies
offering to set up Irish companies for foreign investors through which
they can conduct their business tax free. All offer a choice of ready-made
companies, management and administrative services, and bank introduc-
tions for as little as £225. The service is similar to what they can pro-
vide in other parts of the world such as Hong Kong, the Seychelles and
the Bahamas. Some of the advertisements are more intriguing though.
Waterford-based Chartered Offshore Services, for instance, offers some
free advice to any of its potential clients. Rule number one, do not use
an incorporation agent in your country as this creates a file on your
offshore identity in your own country. This is not wise," reads its adver-
tisement in the Economist.
Id.
44. Like these advertisements, Mark Brennock's slightly witty Irish Times
piece on tax dodging and money laundering, highlights the deference Ireland's
incorporation process accorded to foreign investors wishing to set up IRNRs:
So you're a foreigner and you've got, say, a few hundred thousand
pounds whose existence you would prefer was not revealed to the reve-
nue authorities-or perhaps the police-in your country. Welcome to Ire-
land. For a mere £1,500 start costs and about £1,300 per annum after
that you can have your problem solved, courtesy of an Irish Registered
Non-Resident company. You approach a company formation specialist in
Ireland .. .and fill in your company application form. The information
required here is limited to the company name, its business, the names of
the directors and shareholders. But, if you don't fancy putting your own
name down as a director, don't worry: the company formation specialist
is aware that you may have a difficulty. He or she can provide nominee
directors and a correspondence address, and will also deal with your
annual returns.
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Foreign investors also were attracted to Ireland because,
like the United Kingdom, Ireland had historically determined
residence for purposes of tax on income and capital gains by
reference to the location of management and control, rather
than the country of incorporation.45 In 1988, however, the
United Kingdom closed off this loophole and since then, "par-
ticularly in Eastern Europe following the fall of communism
and the demolition of the Berlin Wall, Ireland has been touted
as a location where the [non-resident] company structure ex-
ists."46 At first, the Central Bank tried to deter use of Irish
non-resident companies, but after a few months their resis-
tance waned. From then on IRNRs became very popular not
only with international tax planners but also those foreign
investors who wished to hide money from their native
country's tax authorities. 7
After the United Kingdom's 1988 Finance Act, Ireland
became the only European Union country that had not aban-
doned a management and control test for determining corpo-
rate residence." Thus, Ireland was the only European Union
Member State that allowed non-resident companies to incorpo-
rate without incurring any tax liability.49 Essentially, a for-
eign investor, by setting up a non-resident company in Ireland,
was able to reap the benefits of being an Irish registered com-
pany, yet remain non-resident for tax purposes simply by
maintaining their management and control outside of Ire-
land.5"
Another tax incentive Ireland offered foreign investors was
its 10 percent corporate tax rate introduced in 1980, 5' that is
now being phased out to comply with European Union state
aid rules and the EU Code of Conduct on harmful tax competi-
tion. 2 This tax rate applied to companies involved in manu-
Brennock, supra note 37.
45. See Walsh, supra note 15, at 711; Edna Faughnan, Substantial Bill In.
cludes a Rich Mix of Measures, IRISH TIMES, Feb. 12, 1999, at 3.
46. DAiL DEB. (Feb. 26, 1998), available at http:J/ww/irlgov.ie:80/debates/
26feb98/sect3.htm.
47. See Kilcullen, supra note 7.
48. See Faughnan, supra note 45.
49. See Coghlan, supra note 25.
50. See Donal McNally, Seminar Papers: The Implications of Ireland's New
Corporate Regime-An Update (Sept. 17, 1999), available at http:J/194.125.145.47/
lpbin/lpext.dlIIWH (last visited Sept. 22, 1999).
51. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 1, at 41.
52. See Michael Tutty, Seminar on Strategy for the Development of Interna-
1214 [Vol. XXVI:3
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facturing and international services activities, and to financial
services activities located in specific areas. 3  As Ralph
McDarby, General Counsel for Deloitte Touche, said "people
fail to realise that because of our corporation tax rate-and 10
percent is a very sexy rate-we are a tax haven, and as such are
attractive to foreign companies."54
These tax incentives, in combination with the simple,
inexpensive and anonymous incorporation process, and
Ireland's international reputation as a well-regulated business
environment, makes it an ideal location for foreign investors to
hide money from their native country's tax authorities. Not
only is Ireland a Member State of the European Union, but it
is also home to the world renowned International Financial
Services Centre. Together, these two factors formed the foun-
dation of Ireland's superior international financial services
reputation. Ironically, it was Ireland's reputation as a well-
regulated financial center that served to mask the tax-haven
proponents of its tax and company law system. Unlike transac-
tions with blacklisted countries such as the Bahamas, the
Cayman Islands, or the Isle of Man, transactions with an Irish-
registered company were not automatically suspect.55 Without
tional Financial Services in Ireland: The Fiscal and Taxation Environment (June
18, 1999), available at http://www.irlgov.ielfinance/mcc446.htm (last visited Sept. 13,
1999).
53. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 1, at 41.
Whereas tax havens levy little or no direct taxes, certain countries
which, in principle, impose direct taxes grant particular industries or
types of activity an exemption from tax in order to promote their devel-
opment. A number of developing countries offer such tax holidays, espe-
cially to manufacturing or labour-intensive industries. It is usual for
developed countries to offer more targeted tax incentives to businesses,
especially those in the financial services sector, in order not only to de-
velop the skills of their workforce but also to integrate their economies
more fully with other economies in the region. [An] example of this [is]
the Irish incentives for Dublin financial services centre companies. Possi-
bly the best known tax incentive offered by a European country is the
Irish manufacturing relief, which provides for manufacturing activities to
be taxed at a reduced rate of 10 percent. The definition of manufacturing
for the purpose of this relief is also surprisingly wide, including as it
does software development.
OGLEY, supra note 31, at 80.
54. Hugh Donovan, IRNR Allegations Threaten Irish Business Image, SUNDAY
BUS. POST, Mar. 1, 1998, available at http://www.sbpost.ie/archives/01-03-
1998/news/rnr.html (last visited May 16, 2000).
55. See Brennock, supra note 37.
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the reputation stigma tax-haven countries bear, Irish-regis-
tered companies did not "arouse a second thought" by the reve-
nue authorities in overseas jurisdictions."6
In 1987, the IFSC was established to develop a strong
international financial services industry that would boost em-
ployment and rejuvenate the Dublin docklands6 7 Today, the
IFSC is the fastest growing center of its kind in Europe and
many of the world's top banks and financial institutions now
have operations in the IFSC.5" The International Financial
Services Centre is a "microcosm of the wider development of
Ireland over the past decade" known as the Celtic Tiger."0 At
its inception, the IFSC had only 7 employees but by 1999 it
had 7,000 employees. 0 "As an example of the financial scale
of the docklands-based operation, the IFSC funds industry
administers or manages the equivalent of over twice Ireland's
GNP annually."6 ' Companies operated through the IFSC are
strictly regulated by Government departments and the Central
Bank. 2 Less regulated non-resident companies take advan-
tage of the perception that they are part of the IFSC and thus
regulated in the same manner, but this is not the case. 3 To
foster this perception, foreign investors often give their IRNRs
names which suggest that they operate through the IFSC. It is
for this reason, that we see the new legislation prohibiting the
use of company names that are "unwittingly similar" to any
names already existing on the Company Register." According
to Noel Treacy, Minister of State at the Department of Enter-
prise, Trade and Employment, the most troubling aspect of
56. Id.
57. See International Financial Services Centre, at http://www.irlgov.ie/
taoiseachlorganisation/ifsc/default.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 1999). "The activities
carried out at the IFSC include Banking and Asset Financing;, Corporate Treasury
Management; Fund Management, Custody and Administration; Futures and Op-
tions Trading, and Life Insurance and Reinsurance." Id.
58. See id.
59. Dept. of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, IFSC is Microcasm of Celtic
Tiger, June 18, 1999, at http:/www.entemp.ie:/80/pressreI180699.htm (last visited
June 21, 2000). Ireland's booming economy in the 1990s, dubbed the Celtic Tiger,
was memorialized by Don Creedon in his humorous play Celtic Tiger Me Arse.
60. See id.
61. Id.
62. See Craig, Ireland's List of Finance Priorities Includes Schedule of Rate
Cuts for Corporation Tax, supra note 39.
63. See IRISH TIMES, supra note 6.
64. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 1, at 28.
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this false perception is that it seriously damages the reputa-
tion of the IFSC as a center where reputable companies are
properly regulated.65 According to industry sources, the full
impact of the damage done to the IFSC's international repu-
tation by the activities of some IRNRs may not become evident
for years.66 But they believe that the damage may be serious
and that the harm is "more likely to manifest itself, not so
much in the amount of business that will leave the IFSC, but
in the projects that will ultimately be lost to other coun-
tries."67 Ultimately, the reputation of the IFSC as a well-regu-
lated financial services center, that IRNR-owners were relying
on to mask their illegal activities, was simultaneously being
destroyed by their nefarious activities.68
C. Ireland's First Attempt at Change
As a result of the negative impact IRNRs had on its finan-
cial services reputation, Ireland set forth new reporting re-
quirements in section 58 of its 1995 Finance Act hoping to
make Ireland less attractive to undesirable foreign inves-
tors.69 Before Ireland's 1995 Finance Act, the technical re-
quirement that obliged IRNRs to provide certain information
was often overlooked.7" In reality, IRNRs were not required to
provide information to the Revenue Commissioners until they
began to carry on a trade, profession, or business in Ireland.7
Section 58 amended section 141 of the Corporation Tax Act
1976 to require that "every company which is incorporated in
the State and is neither resident in the State nor carrying on a
trade, profession or business therein" must provide the Reve-
nue Commissioners with a written statement containing par-
ticulars about the company.72 This statement must be given
65. See DAJL DEB. (Feb. 26, 1998), available at http://www/irlgov.ie:80/de-
bates/26feb98/sect3.htm.
66. See Creaton, supra note 24.
67. Id.
68. See Jane Suiter, Teaching Banks How to Keep Hands Clean, IRISH TIMES,
Mar. 20, 1998, at 6.
69. See DAIL DEB. (Feb. 26, 1998), available at http:J/www/irlgov.ie:80/debates
26feb98/sect3.htm.
70. See Declan Gavin, New Reporting Requirements for Irish Nonresident Com-
panies, 12 TAX NOTES INTL 1939 (1996).
71. See id.
72. Finance Act (1995), available at http://www.irlgov.ie:80/agISTATUTES/
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within thirty days of (a) the date it commences to carry on a
trade, profession, or business, "wherever carried on," (b) any
time there is a material change in the information previously
given by the company, and (c) upon notice to the company by
an inspector requiring a statement under this subsection. 3
Companies now were required to provide the Revenue Commis-
sioners with information such as (1) the name of the company;
(2) the addresses of its registered office in Ireland and its office
in its principal place of business; (3) the nature of its trade,
profession, or business; (4) the name and address of the
company's secretary; (5) the name and address of the compa-
ny74 or individual(s) who have control of the company; (6) the
territory where the central management and control of the
company is usually carried out; and, (7) "such other informa-
tion as the Revenue Commissioners consider necessary for the
purposes of determining the territory in which the company is
resident for the purposes of tax."75
As the 1995 Explanatory Memorandum clearly states,
these new reporting requirements were passed because "cer-
tain Irish incorporated non-resident companies have been used
for undesirable activities and have brought Irish incorporated
companies into disrepute."76 The steps taken were intended to
"turn the spotlight" on those using IRNRs for "unacceptable
purposes" and in this way force them to conduct their affairs
elsewhere. 7  This was the intent, but unfortunately not the
result, as the reporting requirements were not enough to deter
the improper use of IRNRs." The problems with the 1995 pro-
95008004.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 1999).
73. Id.
74. The 1995 Finance Act states that:
Where the company is controlled by a company the shares in
which are listed in the official list of a recognised stock exchange and
have been the subject of dealings on the said exchange in the period of
12 months ending at the time at which the statement is delivered, the
name of that company and the address of its registered office are re-
quired information.
Id.
75. Id.
76. DAIL DEB. (Feb. 26, 1998), available at http:/Awww/irlgov.ie:80/debates/
26feb98/sect3.htm.
77. Id.
78. See id. During DOil Debates, the Minister of State for the Department of
Enterprise, Trade and Employment, Mr. Treacy, stated that "parties who use these
companies are prepared to ignore their obligations under both tax and company
1218 [Vol. XXVI:3
NON-RESIDENT COMPANIES
visions were two-fold. First, they could not be properly en-
forced because non-resident companies are controlled and man-
aged abroad and there was usually no person in Ireland
against whom proceedings could be initiated in the event of
non-compliance.7s Second, unless a company openly claimed to
be non-resident, there was no way to identify it as such from
the details filed with the Registrar of Companies.8"
One commentator suggests that the reporting require-
ments were a "warning rather than a serious policing poli-
cy."81 Even though the Revenue Commissioners were now en-
titled to receive information about the nature and business of
IRNRs, it was still unclear that they could do anything if they
suspected illegal activity unless these companies were in fact
engaged in a trade or business in Ireland." So "what was the
point of section 58" if the Revenue Commissioners had no pow-
er against companies they suspected were involved in tax eva-
sion and other illegal activities? 3 Since IRNRs had no tax
liability in Ireland, the state did not directly lose revenue be-
cause of them. This explains why Revenue failed to tackle the
situation adequately." In fact, Revenue regarded the IRNR
situation as a company law problem to be dealt with by the
Registrar of Companies.
As early as 1996, section 58's failure to effectively combat
the unlawful use of IRNRs sparked discussion about further
reform." Some commentators suggested that Ireland switch
to a "place of incorporation test" for determining corporate
residency in order to eliminate the illegal use of IRNRs, but
even at this time there were those who opposed this idea.87
law and to challenge the authorities to come after them. For instance, in 1995, an
article in an international magazine suggested that parties could ignore requests
for information from the Revenue Commissioners on the basis that the chances
they would be pursued by Revenue were rather remote." DAIL DEB. (May 27,
1999), available at http:J/www/irlgov.ie:80/debates-99/27may99/sect2.htm.
79. See Walsh, supra note 15, at 711.
80. See Dept. of Finance, Irish Registered Non-Resident Companies (Nov. 13,
1998), at http:J/www.irlgov.ie:80/finance/tsg/tsg9855.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 1999).
81. Donovan, supra note 54.
82. See Gavin, supra note 70, at 1940.
83. Donovan, supra note 54.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See Gavin, supra note 70.
87. See id.
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Four years after its first attempt and failure, the Irish govern-
ment once again passed legislation to combat the abuse of non-
resident companies. In order to avoid the further damage
that adverse publicity about IRNRs would have on the IFSC
and Ireland generally, the Irish government passed the 1999
Finance Act and the Companies (Amendment) (No. 2) Act.89
These two pieces of legislation comprise a "comprehensive
package" of significant tax and company law measures aimed
at ridding Ireland of undesirable IRNRs while retaining the
legitimate use of IRNRs by multinational corporations for
international tax planning purposes."
III. ANALYSIS OF NEW LEGISLATION
A. A Two-Prong Attack
1. 1999 Finance Act
Although Ireland's 1999 Finance Act makes numerous
changes9 of great importance to the Irish economy, 2 this
Note focuses on the amendments made to the Taxes Consolida-
tion Act of 1997 (TCA) to combat the unlawful use of Irish
registered non-resident companies. The first significant amend-
ment implemented to combat the abuse of IRNRs is section
23A(2) which redefines Irish corporate residency by making all
companies incorporated in Ireland residents for the purpose of
tax status. 3 This determination of corporate residency is a
88. See Finance Act, No. 2 (1999); Companies (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, No.
30 (1999).
89. Id.
90. Minister of Finance Charlie McCreevy, supra note 14.
91. The changes made to TCA sections 23A and 882 shall apply "(a) in the
case of companies, which are incorporated on or after the 11th day of February,
1999, as on and from that day, and (b) in the case of companies which were in-
corporated before the 11th day of February, 1999, as on and from the 1st day of
October, 1999." Finance Bill (1999), available at http://www.irlgov.ie/oireachtas/
frame.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2000).
92. See Faughnan, supra note 45. Other significant changes made in this Irish
tax legislation include the phasing in of a maximum Irish corporation tax rate of
12.5 percent and the introduction of a new regime of withholding tax on dividend
payments. See Cristiano Medori, End of Irish Nonresident Companies is at Hand,
INTL TAX REP. (Apr. 1999).
93. See Finance Act, No. 2 (1999). Section 23A(2) reads, "Subject to subsec-
tions (3) and (4), a company which is incorporated in the State shall be regarded
for the purposes of the Tax Acts and the Capital Gains Tax Acts as residents in
the State." Id.
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break from the past because Ireland has traditionally deter-
mined corporate residence by a corporation's center of control
and management.'
There are two exceptions to the mandatory corporate resi-
dency requirement provided in section 23A:
(3) Subsection (2) shall not apply to a company which is in-
corporated in the State if the company is a relevant company
and
(a) carries on a trade in the State, or
(b) is related to a company which carries on a trade in
the State.
(4) Notwithstanding subsection (2), a company which is re-
garded for the purposes of any arrangements as resident in a
territory other than the State and not resident in the State
shall be treated for the purposes of the Tax Acts and the
Capital Gains Tax Acts as not resident in the State.95
The first way for a company incorporated in Ireland to
avoid the mandatory residency requirement is to qualify under
the active trading test.96 In order to qualify as a non-resident
under the active trading test, the incorporated company must
not only carry on a trade in Ireland or be related to a company
that carries on a trade in Ireland, but also be a "relevant com-
pany.-" Section 23A(1) defines a "relevant company" as a
company:
(i) which is under the control, whether directly or indirectly,
of a person or persons who is or are
(I) by virtue of the law of any relevant territory, resi-
dent for purposes of tax in a relevant territory or rele-
vant territories, and
(II) not under the control, whether directly or indirectly,
of a person who is, or persons who are, not so resident,
or
(ii) which is, or is related to, a company the principal class of
the shares of which is substantially and regularly traded on
one or more than one recognised stock exchange in a relevant
territory or territories.98
94. See Walsh, supra note 15, at 711.
95. Finance Act, No. 2 (1999).
96. See id.
97. Id.
98. Id. Section 23A1) also defines "relevant territory" as an European Corn-
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The first classification of relevant company "focuses on the
residence of those who ultimately 'control' the company and
not on the residence of the company itself."99 To determine
whether a company is "relevant," it is essential to understand
the meaning of "control" as defined by TCA 1997 section 432,
subsections 2-6 (including the modifications made to subsection
6 by the 1999 Finance Act).00 Section 432(2) states that a
person has control of a company if the "person exercises, or is
able to exercise or is entitled to acquire control, whether direct
or indirect, over the company's affairs."' More specifically, a
person "controls" a company if they possess or are entitled to
acquire (1) "the greater part of the share capital of the compa-
ny or the greater part of the voting power in the company, (2)
such part of the issued share capital as would entitle the per-
son to the greater part of the income available for distribution,
or (3) such rights as would entitle the person to the greater
part of the assets distributable on a winding up."0 2
These guidelines for defining control set forth by section
432 should be construed as to attribute control to persons
whether or not they are residents of an European Union or tax
treaty country. 3 Because more than one person can "control"
a company according to section 432, it is only relevant to deter-
mine whether any who ultimately control the company meet
the residence test; not if other groups who also ultimately
control the company do not meet the test.0 4 This require-
ment that ultimate residence be in an EU or tax treaty country
discourages "treaty shopping" into an IRNR via an EU or tax
treaty country.
0 5
munity Member State or a government with whom Ireland has a tax treaty agree-
ment. Id.
99. Kilcullen, supra note 7.
100. Id.
101. Taxes Consolidation Act, No. 39 (1997).
102. Kilcullen, supra note 7.
Section 432 then goes on to say that if two or more persons to-
gether satisfy any of these conditions they will be taken to have control
of the company. It also provides that 'entitled to acquire' includes any-
thing which a person is now entitled to acquire in the future or will
become entitled to acquire.
Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Walsh, supra note 15, at 713.
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The second classification of relevant companies refers to
companies whose principal class of shares is "substantially and
regularly" traded on one or more recognized stock exchange;
including companies related to this classification of compa-
nies. 6 A company is "treated as related to another company
if one company is a 51 percent subsidiary of the other company
or both companies are 51 percent subsidiaries of a third com-
pany."'07 A company must use the following factors listed in
TCA 1997 section 412 in order to determine a 51 percent sub-
sidiary relationship: "(1) the percentage of ordinary share capi-
tal held; (2) the percentage of the profits available for distribu-
tion to which the parent is entitled; and (3) the percentage of
the assets distributable on a winding up to which the parent
would be entitled."' This second classification of "relevant
company" is a concession, albeit small, to the handful of in-
bound investors to Ireland from non-tax treaty countries.0 9
This observation is supported by the reduction of percentage
required to establish a subsidiary relationship from 75 percent
to 51 percent,"0 thus making it easier to establish related-
ness.
Contrary to the first classification of "relevant company"
which is read expansively to attribute control to all persons
possible, the second classification of "relevant company" is read
narrowly, in that a company is not related to a parent compa-
ny if any of the above TCA factors produce a percentage less
than 50 percent."' In other words, if a company with a stock
exchange listing in an EU or tax treaty country owns the Irish
company directly or indirectly (at least 51 percent) then man-
datory residence will not apply."2 For example, a New York
Stock Exchange listing subject to substantial and regular trad-
ing at the ultimate-parent level would protect an Irish-incorpo-
rated company with active trading operations from mandatory
Irish residence."'
106. Finance Act, No. 2 (1999).
107. Id.
108. Kilcullen, supra note 7.
109. Walsh, supra note 15, at 713.
110. See Finance Act, No. 2 (1999).
111. Kilcullen, supra note 7.
112. See Walsh, supra note 15, at 713.
113. See id.
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For a company to satisfy the "trade" requirement of
23A(3), it appears that its transactions within Ireland must
not be merely singular and superficial, but rather consist of a
"continuing economic activity undertaken with a view to prof-
it," thus making it fall within the normal meaning of "trade"
for tax purposes." 4 This being said, no de minimis rules have
been established for the amount of trading activity required in
Ireland if a company is to continue to qualify as a non-resi-
dent. Therefore, it may be inferred that any level of trade will
suffice provided it is genuine."'
The second avenue for a company incorporated in Ireland
to avoid the mandatory residency requirement is to qualify
under the treaty residence test."' In order for a company in-
corporated in Ireland to qualify as a non-resident under the
treaty residence test it must, by virtue of a tax treaty
agreement, be resident in another State and not resident in
Ireland."7 To avoid any possible confusion, many of these
treaties also would provide a tiebreaker test of residence to
ensure that a company dually resident under domestic law is
deemed resident in the place of effective management."8
In short, to be exempt from mandatory residence, a compa-
ny incorporated in Ireland must pass either an active trading
or treaty residence test."' A company incorporated in Ireland
will be deemed a resident, therefore, unless the company or
related company carries on a trade in the State and either (a)
is ultimately controlled by a resident of an EU or tax treaty
country or is listed on the stock exchange of an EU or tax
treaty country or (b) the company is deemed a non-resident in
Ireland under a tax treaty between Ireland and another coun-
try." Ironically, many companies with real Irish operations
will be excluded as residents, whereas many companies with
no Irish connections will be included as residents.''
114. Kilcullen, supra note 7.
115. See id.
116. See Finance Act, No. 2 (1999).
117. See Finance Bill (1999), available at http://www.irlgov.ie/oireachtas/
frame.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2000).
118. See Walsh, supra note 15, at 713.
119. See id.
120. See Finance Act, No. 2 Explanatory Memorandum (1999).
121. See Walsh, supra note 15.
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Section 83 of the 1999 Finance Act now requires compa-
nies incorporated in Ireland, resident or non-resident, lo report
certain significant information to the Revenue Commissioners
that they were not compelled to disclose in the past.'22 Each
company must report the following information to the Revenue
Commissioners within thirty days of commencing to carry on a
trade, profession, or business whether commenced in or out of
State:m
(1) the name of the company,
(2) the address of the company's registered office,
(3) the address of its principal place of business,
(4) the name and address of the secretary of the company,
(5) the date of commencement of the trade, profession or
business,
(6) the date up to which accounts relating to such trade,
profession or business will be made up, and
(7) such other information as the Revenue Commissioners
consider necessary for the purposes of the Tax Acts."
Companies incorporated but not resident in Ireland, large-
ly inbound investors and companies resident in treaty coun-
tries under tiebreaker clauses, 12 must provide additional in-
formation such as: the name of the territory in which the com-
pany is resident for tax purposes, the name and address of the
company that carries on trade in Ireland (which may be the
company itself or a related company), or the name and address
of the ultimate beneficial owners of the company.'26 These
reporting requirements symbolize considerable change for
inbound investors who for the first time must disclose the
122. See id.
123. The required information must also be given within thirty days if there is
a "material change in information previously delivered by the company" or if an
inspector gives the company notice that it requires a statement. Finance Act, No.
2 (1999).
124. Id.
125. See Walsh, supra note 15, at 714.
126. See Finance Act, No. 2 (1999). Ultimate beneficial owners are the indi-
viduals who have "control of the company. If the company is controlled by a trust-
ee or trustees of a settlement the term 'ultimate beneficial owners' is to include
the settlor or anyone who can reasonably expect to become a beneficiary of the
settlement or, where the settlors or beneficiaries are companies, the ultimate bene-
ficial owners of the company or companies." Kilcullen, supra note 7. See also Fi-
nance Act, No. 2 (1999).
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country in which their IRNR is tax resident. '27 Even more
significant, however, may be the burden these reporting re-
quirements place on some companies to disclose the ultimate
beneficial owners; a public company, for instance, may find
such a task nearly impossible.'28 However, "it should be em-
phasized that disclosure of ultimate beneficial owners will be
required only when exemption from the new legislation is
claimed based on a treaty tiebreaker and will not apply to
inbound investors exempt based on real Irish activities."'29
Companies that are neither incorporated nor resident in
Ireland, but carry on a trade, profession, or business in Ire-
land, also must report the address of the company's principal
place of business in Ireland, the name and address of the
agent, manager, or other representative of the company, and
the date of commencement of the company's activities in Ire-
land.13° If a company does not report the required informa-
tion, the Revenue Commissioners may give notice in writing to
the Registrar of Companies stating that the company has
failed to deliver a statement under section 83.'
2. The Companies (Amendment) (No. 2) Act
To complement the corporate taxation measures intro-
duced by the 1999 Finance Act to combat the illegal use of
IRNRs, the Irish government enacted the Companies (Amend-
ment) (No. 2) Act. The company law amendments include three
main features: (1) a requirement that all Irish-incorporated
companies carry on business activity in Ireland; (2) a require-
ment that all Irish-incorporated companies have an Irish resi-
dent director; and lastly, (3) a restriction on the number of
company directorships that an individual may hold. According
to section 42, a prerequisite to company formation is sufficient
evidence provided by the company to the Registrar of Compa-
nies that it intends to carry on activities13 in Ireland.13' A
127. See Walsh, supra note 15, at 714.
128. See id.
129. Id.
130. See Finance Act, No. 2 (1999).
131. See id.
132. "An 'activity' means any activity that a company may be lawfully formed
to carry on and includes the holding, acquisition or disposal of property of whatso-
ever kind." Companies (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, No. 30 (1999).
133. See id.; Kilcullen, supra note 7; Dept. of Finance, supra note 80.
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statutory declaration made by a director or secretary of the
company to be formed,"" stating that the purposes or one of
the purposes for which the company is being formed is the
carrying on of an activity in Ireland, satisfies this evidentiary
requirement.'35 If the activity falls within the "relevant clas-
sification system,"'36 then the declaration must state the gen-
eral nature of the activity and the division, group, and class of
the system to which the activity belongs.'37 If the activity
does not fall within the "relevant classification system" then
the declaration must contain a precise description of the activi-
ty. '3 Each declaration also must contain the places in Ire-
land where the company intends to carry on the activity and
the place, whether in Ireland or not, where the central admin-
istration of the company normally will be carried on.'39 By
establishing a link between incorporation and the State, this
provision prevents the use of IRNRs for exclusively foreign
activities.14
Pursuant to section 43, new companies must appoint and
maintain at all times an Irish resident director.'4 ' Existing
companies have twelve months before such requirement be-
comes mandatory.4 1 This requirement ensures that there is a
person within Ireland whom the Revenue authorities and the
Companies Registration Office can pursue when a company
fails to comply with its obligations under Irish law.' Alter-
134. See Companies (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, No. 30 (1999). A solicitor en-
gaged in the formation of the company may also make a statutory declaration. See
id.
135. See id.
136. Id. The "relevant classification system" is defined as "the common basis
for statistical classifications of economic activities within the European Community
set out in the Annex to Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3037/90 of 9 October 1990."
Id.
137. See id.
138. Id.
139. See id.
140. See DAIL DEB. (May 27, 1999), available at http'/www/irlgov.ie:80/
debates99/27may99/sect2.htm.
141. "Residency in this instance is a company law concept meaning that direc-
tors must be domiciled in Ireland." Id. For the precise calculation of the "relevant
time" a person must be resident in Ireland in order to fulfill section 43s obliga-
tions see section 44(8),(9). Companies (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, No. 30 (1999).
142. See Companies (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, No. 30 (1999).
143. See DAIL DEB. (May 27, 1999), available at http://www/irlgov.ie:80/debates-
99/27may99/sect2.htm.
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natively, if a company chooses not to appoint an Irish resident
director they may post a £20,000 bond as a surety to pay any
fines or penalties that may arise because of a company's non-
compliance with the new tax or company law require-
ments.' Additionally, section 43(9) requires Irish resident
directors to notify the Registrar of Companies in writing if they
cease to be a director and there are no other Irish resident
directors at the company.145 Irish resident directors who fail
to comply with section 43(9) are jointly and severally liable for
any fine or penalty imposed on the company by section
43(3).146 The purpose of this amendment, therefore, is to pro-
tect outgoing resident directors who notify the Registrar of
Companies that to the best of their knowledge the company
does not have an Irish resident director.17 This protection is
necessary because the outgoing director's belief that the com-
pany has no other Irish resident director may not be accurate.
Therefore, by notifying the Registrar of Companies, outgoing
directors can separate themselves from the IRNR's potential
liabilities. 48 Without this protection, outgoing directors might
be deterred from complying with their reporting obligations
under section 43(9).149
A company may be exempt from the Irish resident director
and alternate bond requirements, however, if it has a Registrar
of Companies' certificate evidencing that it has a "real and
continuous link" with one or more economic activities carried
on in Ireland.50 In order to obtain certification, a company
must get a statement from the Revenue Commissioners that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the company has
such a link.'5 ' Furthermore, the Registrar of Companies may
withdraw a certificate upon receipt of information from the
Revenue Commissioners that the company has ceased to have
144. See Companies (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, No. 30 (1999).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See DAIL DEB. (Nov. 3, 1999), available at http/Avww/irlgov.ie:80/
debates99/3nov99/sect2.htm.
148. See id.
149. Id.
150. Companies (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, No. 30 (1999).
151. See id.
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a real and continuous link with any economic activity in Ire-
land. 15
2
In addition, section 45 limits the number of directorships
an individual may hold to twenty-five, subject to certain ex-
emptions.15 Section 45 contains reasonable grounds for ex-
emption to benefit legitimate multi-directorships, including
group situations where such multiple directorships will be
counted as one.' Moreover, where there is prior screening of
directors, as occurs in the regulated sectors, the holding of
such directorships also may be exempted from the limit on
directorships. 55 More specifically, section 45 excludes from
the number of company directorships the following types of
companies: public limited companies; related companies (e.g.
part of the group); companies that hold a certificate of trade in
the International Financial Services Centre or the Shannon
Free Airport Development Zone; companies that operate in a
regulated sector and are subject to authorizations (e.g. finan-
cial or insurance companies); and companies that have their
central administration in Ireland or otherwise have a real and
continuous link with Ireland. 5 ' A person who already holds
twenty-five directorships must get authorization from the Reg-
istrar of Companies prior to taking another directorship with
any of the companies listed above.'5 ' If a person acts as a di-
rector for more than twenty-five companies, without such au-
thorization, they are guilty of an offense punishable by way of
a fine or imprisonment.' 8 The restriction on the number of
152. See id.
153. Id. For the purposes of section 45(1), "director" includes a shadow director
(within the meaning of the Companies Act, 1990). Id.
154. See SEANAD DEB. (Nov. 25, 1999), available at http'J/www/irlgov.ie:80/de-
bates-99/s25nov99/sect4.htm; DAIL DEB. (May 27, 1999), available at http/www/irl-
gov.ie:80/debates-99/27may99/sect2.htm.
155. See SEANAD DEB. (Nov. 25, 1999), available at http://www/irlgov.ie:80/de-
bates-99/s25nov99/sect4.htm; DAIL DEB. (May 27, 1999), available at http'/lwwwirl-
gov.ie:80/debates-99/27may99/sect2.htm.
156. See Medori, supra note 92; Companies (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, No. 30
(1999).
157. Section 45 contains a mechanism whereby applications can be made in the
first instance to the Registrar of Companies and subsequently in certain instances
appeals can be made to the Minister. See DAIL DEB. (May 27, 1999), available at
http://www/irlgov.ie:80/debates-99/27may99/sect2.htm; Companies (Amendment) (No.
2) Act, No. 30 (1999).
158. See Companies (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, No. 30 (1999); see also Medori,
supra note 92.
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directorships is designed to tackle the use of nominee directors
to disguise beneficial ownership,159 whereas the exemptions
are intended to preserve legitimate multi-directorships."'
The implications of an individual holding upwards of one hun-
dred nominee directorships, Mr. Treacy points out, "cannot but
bring the company law regime into disrepute." 6'
Section 46 gives the Registrar of Companies enhanced
powers to strike companies off the register the first year they
fail to meet their reporting requirements under the tax or
company law provisions; namely, failure to make the statutory
annual return to the Companies Registration Office or failure
to register with the Revenue Commissioners for tax purpos-
es.'62 In the past, a company had to be in default for at least
two years before the Registrar of Companies could begin
strike-off proceedings. 6 ' These enhanced strike-off powers
are a reaction to the abysmal compliance rate. Only 13 percent
of companies met their obligations on time in 1997." The
Registrar of Companies' enhanced powers are to ensure that
when individuals ignore their responsibilities, effective action
can be taken against them.'65
Equally important, sections 47-49 provide for enhanced
notification to the Registrar of Companies by individuals who
have ceased to be directors. Previously, it was the responsibili-
159. See Dept. of Finance, supra note 80.
160. See DAIL DEB. (May 27, 1999), available at http:lwww/irlgov.ie:80/
debates99/27may99/sect2.htm.
161. SEANAD DEB. (Nov. 25, 1999), available at http://Ivww/irlgov.ie:80/debates-
99/s25nov99/sect4.htm. One individual was found to be the director of over 1,500
companies. DAIL DEB. (May 27, 1999), available at http://www/irlgov.ie:80/debates-
99/27may99/sect2.htm. Mr. Treacy is the Minister of State at the Department of
Enterprise, Trade and Employment. See id.
162. Companies (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, No. 30 (1999); Treacy Publishes Com-
panies (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 1999, Mar. 22, 1999, at http:/www.entem.ie:80/
pressrel/240399e.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 1999). To "strike-off" a company means
that it is removed from the Irish company register and thus has no legal exis-
tence. Brian McDonald & John Homan, Finance Act Targets Irish Nonresident
Companies, 10 J. INT'L TAX'N 9 (1999).
163. See Dept. of Finance, supra note 80. Before a company is struck off the
company register, section 46 provides for proper notification to the company of the
proceedings against them. See Companies (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, No. 30 (1999);
SEANAD DEB. (Nov. 25, 1999), available at httpJ/www/irlgov.ie:80/debates-
99/s25nov99/sect4.htm.
164. See SEANAD DEB. (Nov. 25, 1999), available at http:/Iwww/irlgov.ie:80/
debates99/s25nov99/sect4.htm.
165. See id.
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ty of the company to notify the Registrar of Companies of any
changes in their directors. Section 47 now allows resigning
directors to notify the Registrar of Companies themselves.'66
Similar to section 43(9), these amendments provide a mecha-
nism for making outgoing directors personally liable where the
officers of a defunct company, struck-off the register, continue
to operate as if the company was not dissolved.'67 There have
been instances, for example, where companies have deliberate-
ly failed to notify the Registrar of Companies of a director's
resignation, despite the resigning director's request that the
company notify the Registrar of Companies.'68 This type of
misconduct highlights companies' abuse in this area and the
need for change.
B. Effectiveness of the Two-Prong Attack
Based on past experience, the Irish government knew that
any changes made to its corporate tax laws would be ineffec-
tive to combat the abuse of IRNRs unless it also created a
mechanism to enforce violations. For this reason, Ireland's
1995 attempt to eliminate the illegal use of IRNRs failed. Min-
ister of Finance, Mr. McCreevy's impassioned plea in the Feb-
ruary 26, 1998 D6il Debates illustrates the frustration felt as a
result of failed attempts to combat this serious problem. "I
want to make clear," Mr. McCreevy declared, "there should be
no place for these undesirables in the company register of this
State. The last government failed to solve the issue of how to
weed them out in a way that left the healthy plants alone. Let
us see if this government can do better."'69 This time the gov-
ernment has done better because now it is attacking the IRNR
problem on two fronts.
Without rigorous enforcement, those using IRNRs for ne-
farious activities simply ignore their obligations under both tax
and company law based on the arithmetical risk that they will
get away with it. 7 ' For example, only one month after the
166. See Dept. of Finance, supra note 80.
167. See SEANAD DEB. (Nov. 25, 1999), available at http://wwwirlgov.ie:80/
debates99/s25nov99/sect4.htm.
168. See id.
169. DAIL DEB. (Feb. 26, 1998), available at http'J/www/irlgov.ie:80/ de-
bates/26feb98/sect3.htm.
170. DAiL DEB. (May 27, 1999), available at http://www/irlgov.ie:80/
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passage of the 1999 Finance Act, some "ingenious and clever
people" had already found ways around the legislation.171
More onerous requirements and enforcement,'72 therefore,
were needed to bolster the new residency and reporting re-
quirements in the 1999 Finance Act; thus the emergence of a
two-prong legislative attack. The dual nature of Ireland's at-
tack on IRNRs will make it successful this time in preserving
its reputation as a well-regulated financial center while main-
taining incentives for foreign investment. Ireland's second
attempt will be successful because the new tax and company
law measures target companies that have no economic connec-
tion with Ireland and thus are likely to be used for tax evasion
or criminal activity.'73 Furthermore, the new measures not
only minimize any adverse effects on legitimate business, but
also are enforceable and not easily circumvented, thus ensur-
ing their viability as an effective deterrent.'74 An example of
the legislation's deterrent effect is the decreasing number of
new IRNRs incorporating in Ireland; down from 20,874 in
1998, to 18,604 in 1999.17' Equally important, the new mea-
sures are not administratively costly or cumbersome and are
compatible with EU state aid provisions, namely the Code of
Conduct on Business Taxation and the EU Treaty.
176
Compliance with the new tax and company law require-
ments ensures that "all companies will have to be linked more
closely to the State and interface more fully with the Revenue
Commissioners and the Registrar of Companies."' 7  The
debates99/27may99/sect2.htm.
171. Id.
172. In addition to the Registrar of Companies having enhanced powers to
strike companies off the register if they do not comply with either their tax or
company law obligations, a huge investment has been made in modernizing the
Companies Registration Office to improve their enforcement capabilities. See
SEANAD DEE. (Dec. 8, 1999), available at http://www/irlgov.ie:80/
debates99/s8dec99/sect4.htm.
173. See Dept. of Finance, supra note 80.
174. See id.
175. See Houses of the Oireachtas, Select Committee on Finance and the Public
Service, at http'//www.irlgov.ie:80/committees-00/c-finance/000301/page5.htm (last
modified Feb. 2, 2000); DEPT. OF TAOISEACH, STRATEGY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY IN IRELAND PROGRESS REPORT
(Mar. 1, 1999), available at http'/www.irlgov.ie:80/taoiseach/publication/
IFSI/progress.htm (last visited May 16, 2000).
176. See Dept. of Finance, supra note 80.
177. DAi DEB. (June 13, 2000), available at http://www/irlgov.ie:80/debates-
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"strong co-operative effort" between the relevant revenue and
company law authorities developed by the complementary tax
and company law legislation is another strength of Ireland's
two-prong attack. 7 ' The rising number of companies struck
off the register; 31,157 in 1999, compared to 10,003 in 1998,
proves the effectiveness of this co-operative effort. 79 For
these reasons, Ireland's two-prong attack represents a positive
step towards eliminating the illegal use of IRNRs that threat-
ened Ireland's stature as a reputable investment location.8 '
The company law amendments were enacted to comple-
ment the significant corporate tax changes, therefore, in evalu-
ating this legislation, it is important to focus on the overall
package of measures. Together they constitute a powerful
weapon against the use of IRNRs for undesirable purposes in
the future.'8' Moreover, these two pieces of legislation reflect
Ireland's economic advancement and its subsequent movement
away from being a periphery EU country. The strength of the
Irish economy allowed the government to take bold steps such
as addressing the IRNR problem at the incorporation
00/13june/sect7.htm.
178. Id.
179. See id.
180. As Irish Times journalist, Denis Coghlan, suggests in his cynical piece
written about the recent legislation, not everyone is convinced of the effectiveness
of the new measures to combat the abuse of IRNRs. Whether this doubt arises
because of frustration caused by past failed attempts at change or the approach of
the acts themselves is not clear. Mr. Coghlan writes:
The money-laundering activities of some of the 4,000 or so compa-
nies involved and the billions of pounds that had flushed through the
Irish system was dealt with in true Department of Finance style. Money-
laundering became "questionable purposes." And, under the new rules,
mafia bosses and their buddies from the dark side would be required to
identify themselves or the country in which their companies were trading.
As for the Irish professionals who facilitated and grew wealthy on the
trade, they would only be allowed to "front" for 25 companies in the
future. All companies would have to lodge a £20,000 bond and file re-
turns. The Revenue Commissioner would liise with the Registrar of
Companies to ensure non-compliant firms would be struck from the reg-
ister. The Finance Bill will not cause mafia bosses and hardened tax
evaders to shake in their shoes, but it is a hell of an improvement on
the old situation.
Denis Coghlan, McCreevy's Criticisms Bear Fruit as Taoiseach Declines to Answer
Questions, IRISH TIMES, Feb. 17, 1999, at 14.
181. SEANAD DEB. (Nov. 25, 1999), available at http://www/irlgov.ie:80/
debates99/s25nov99/sect4.htm.
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stage,'82 which it would not have been able to do without the
pull of a strong economy behind it.' Whether Ireland's two-
prong attack on IRNRs is analyzed in an economic or political
context, it is clear that Ireland will benefit now and into the
future because it chose an approach that not only solved the
immediate problem, but was responsive to the needs of its
economy.
C. Compliance with European Union Standards
In its attempt to solve the IRNR problem, Ireland not only
had to consider the impact tax and company law changes
would have on its attractiveness to foreign investors, but also
the new measures' compliance with European Union state aid
rules and the EU Code of Conduct on harmful tax competi-
tion."8 Among the European Union Treaty articles the Irish
government had to consider are: article 52, regarding freedom
of establishment; article 53, prohibiting the introduction of new
restrictions; article 56, permitting exemptions on public policy
grounds (but only if the action is proportional and no other ef-
fective remedy is available), article 48, regarding free move-
ment of workers; and article 59, regarding freedom to provide
services." The bond alternative to the Irish resident director
requirement, for example, was a direct result of Ireland's obli-
gation to comply with the EU Treaty. Although some legisla-
tors felt that a £20,000 bond was too easy a hurdle for crimi-
nals wanting to set up companies in Ireland,"6 the bond al-
182. See Dept. of Finance, supra note 80.
183. See SEANAD DEB. (Nov. 25, 1999), available at http:lwwwirlgovie:80/
debates99s25nov99/sect4.htm.
184. Ireland's new corporation tax regime conforms with EU state aid rules
and the EU Code of Conduct on harmful tax competition. See Minister of Finance
Charlie McCreevy, supra note 14.
The Code of Conduct is a political agreement which is without
prejudice to the rights and obligations of the Member States under the
Treaty. It is designed to curb harmful tax competition by targeting tax
measures which have a significant effect on the location of business with-
in the Community and which provide for a significantly lower effective
rate of taxation than the rate generally applying in the Member State in
question. Such measures are regarded as potentially harmful under the
Code.
Tutty, supra note 52.
185. See DAIL DEB. (Nov. 3, 1999), available at http://vww/irlgov.ie:80/
debates99/3nov99/sect2.htm.
186. See DAL DEB. (May 27, 1999), available at http:J/www/irlgov.ie:80/
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ternative was essential to ensure that Ireland complied with
the EU right of establishment and did not discriminate against
EU citizens wishing to set up companies in Ireland for whom
an Irish resident director would be an "undue burden."'87
Again, for EU reasons, the bond alternative had to be a real
alternative; thus it could not be limited to certain circumstanc-
es or be set too high.88 If the bond were pitched too high, an
EU citizen wishing to set up a company in Ireland who did not
want to use the Irish resident director route could argue that
the bond requirement constituted an "undue discrimination"
under the EU Treaty provisions governing freedom of estab-
lishment.'8 9
EU law also restricted what requirements the Irish gov-
ernment could place on Irish resident directors. In order to
prevent the election of nominee directors, proposals were made
to prohibit employees of any agent of the company to be direc-
tors. This proposal failed, however, because according to EU
law a Member State cannot ban anyone from becoming a direc-
tor of a company. 9 ' Nevertheless, legislator Nora Owen cited
the small number of requirements to be an Irish resident di-
rector as a weakness. 9' The legislation she asserted, is "not
worth the paper it is printed on" if secretaries and clerks in
solicitors' offices could continue to be appointed as company
directors without having any involvement in the operation of
the company except to sign documents.' 9 Because this was a
known problem, Mrs. Owen argued there should be at least as
many requirements regarding who can be an Irish resident
director as there are provisions for procuring a bond.'93
debates99/27may99/sect2.htm.
187. Id.
188. See SEANAD DEB. (Nov. 11, 1999), available at http'/lwww/irl-
gov.ie:80/debates99/sllnov99/sect4.htm.
189. See id.
190. See DAIL DEB. (Nov. 3, 1999), available at http'/lwww/irlgov.ie:80/
debates99/3nov99/sect2.htm.
191. See id.
192. Id.
193. See id.
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D. Preservation of Reputation
While Ireland had to draft its legislation to adhere to its
EU obligations, the real goal was to rid the company register
of "undesirables" in order to protect Ireland's financial services
reputation. But in achieving this goal, the Irish government
also wanted to allow companies legitimately using IRNRs for
acceptable business activities to continue to do so. 94 Mary
Harney, the Td-naiste and Minister for Enterprise, Trade and
Employment, highlighted this crucial balance when she stated:
The Government recognises the importance of good regu-
lation in achieving recognition for Ireland, and Irish com-
panies, for high standards in all financial services. At the
same time, we will seek to maintain the competitiveness of
companies established in Ireland and to ensure that the level
of regulation is appropriate and sufficiently flexible to suit
the dynamism of the financial services sector.195
There is a balance that must be struck between attracting
inward investment and ensuring compliance with the new tax
and company law measures. However, such balance also must
take into account the implications the new measures will have
on indigenous enterprise.'96 Because of this delicate balance,
it follows that the solution's focus had to be on the 'Traudsters
and money-launderers," otherwise overly stringent regulation
potentially could damage the economic interests of the
State.'97 There is no doubt that eliminating the non-resident
company structure would solve the problem, but balancing its
interests, Ireland chose not to take this route. The fear was
that enacting legislation eliminating IRNRs entirely negatively
would impact legitimate businesses and discourage foreign
investment in Ireland.
In essence, Ireland's two-prong legislative attack is a prod-
uct of two countervailing interests: protecting Ireland's superi-
or reputation and preserving its foreign investment incentives.
Although these two interests appear to be in competition, in
194. See DAIL DEB. (Feb. 26, 1998), available at http://vww/irlgov.ie:80/de-
bates/26feb98/sect3.htm.
195. Dept. of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, supra note 59.
196. See DAn. DEB. (Feb. 26, 1998), available at http://www/irlgov.ie:80/de-
bates/26feb98/sect3.htm.
197. Id.
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fact, they are interdependent. If Ireland retained its lax tax
and company laws, its reputation would have suffered, causing
Ireland to be a less attractive investment location for legiti-
mate businesses, despite the tax deferral benefits of IRNRs.
Legislator, Nora Owen's, statement at the May 27, 1999 Ddil
Debates reinforces this idea of interdependence between the
seemingly countervailing interests of preserving reputation
and foreign investment incentives: "We have a reputation as a
well regulated financial services centre which we must contin-
ue to protect. The minute we lose that reputation some of the
advances we have made in the last number of years will be put
at great risk."
198
The International Financial Services Centre, 9 9 perhaps
Ireland's most significant advance, was at the greatest risk.
The perception that some IRNRs, not operating through the
IFSC, were being regulated in the same manner as IFSC com-
panies negatively impacted the IFSC's reputation as a well-
regulated financial center."' Mr. Treacy, speaking at the No-
vember 25, 1999 Ddil Debates referred to international finan-
cial services as the "jewel in the crown of Ireland's econo-
my."201 The IFSC, Mr. Treacy declared, has been the
driving force behind the development of the sector. It is large-
ly responsible for the worldwide reputation Ireland now en-
joys as a centre of excellence in the provision of financial
services. The centre has provided a hub around which a
world class support network has grown, encompassing soft-
ware development, telecommunications, shared services
centres and legal and accountancy skills.2 2
The extent to which financial services are an important
feature of the Irish economy underscores why Part XIII of the
Companies Act 1990, which makes specific provision for invest-
ment companies, was amended by section 54 of the Companies
198. DAIL DEB. (May 27, 1999), available at http://www/irlgov.ie:80/
debates99/27may99/sect2.htm.
199. See PRIcEWATERHOUSE, IRELAND: A GUIDE FOR THE US INVEsTOR 44
(1997) (providing general information about the IFSC).
200. See DAIL DEB. (Feb. 26, 1998), available at http:/www/irlgov.ie:80/de-
bates/26feb98/sect3.htm.
201. SEANAD DEB. (Nov. 25, 1999), available at http//www/irlgov.ie:80/
debates99/s25nov99/sect4.htm.
202. Id.
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(Amendment) (No. 2) Act 1999.203 Section 54 evolved in re-
sponse to requests by the funds industry, representing compa-
nies located in the IFSC, for further disapplications from cer-
tain basic provisions of the company law.2 4 Sections 42-51
intended to solve the IRNR problem, however, will apply to
investment companies. Section 54, therefore, was enacted by
the Irish government to counteract these new requirements
and ensure that the funds industry in the IFSC would remain
competitive with its counterparts on the continent.2 5
While concessions are made to lessen the impact of this
new legislation on Ireland's "jewel," its international financial
services industry, it is important to note that these new tax
and company law measures will make it more difficult for all
companies, not just IRNRs, to incorporate in Ireland. One
recent commentator points to the downside of taking wide-
spread action in the company law area; the adverse implica-
tions it will have for business in general, particularly small
businesses, because of the additional cost and administrative
burdens." 6 Insofar as possible, the tax and company law
measures intended to tackle the IRNR problem, although they
will apply to all companies, are designed not to have an "undue
adverse impact" on entrepreneurs who want to use an IRNR
for the legitimate furtherance of their business." 7 Ultimately,
the new tax and company law measures are expected to result
in a somewhat slower incorporation process, but they are not
expected to add significantly to the cost of incorporation.2 '
Despite the questionable impact these new measures may
have on small businesses, this "enlightened legislation" is no
doubt an endorsement of the "maturity of the Irish econo-
my."20 9 Looking back to the "bad old days" of the 1970s and
1980s, legislator Paschal Mooney remembers reading in The
Economist about mature economies, such as Switzerland,
where there were very stringent company regulations, knowing
203. Companies (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, No. 30 (1999).
204. See SEANAD DEB. (Nov. 25, 1999), available at http:l/wvv/irlgov.ie:80/
debates99/s25nov99/sect4.htm.
205. See id.
206. IRISH TIMES, supra note 6.
207. SEANAD DEB. (Nov. 25, 1999), at http://vww/irlgov.ie:80/
debates99/s25nov99/sect4.htm.
208. See id.
209. Id.
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that Ireland at that time was not in the position to do the
same.210 In just a decade, however, Ireland has come "a long,
long way."211 "Once a joke economy with inflation about 15
percent and fiscal deficits about the same percentage of GDP,
whose main export was its young people, Ireland got its act
together in the late 1980s and fashioned itself as a low-cost
English-speaking base for Europe."212 The Irish economy, now
dubbed the Celtic Tiger,21 '3 has done so well in fact that EU
structural funds to Ireland are being phased out because
Ireland's infrastructure can now sustain itself.24 EU aid re-
ductions resulting from Ireland's economic success highlight
Ireland's transition from a periphery EU country, with a weak
rural-based economy, to an EU country with an economy ma-
ture enough to risk stringent regulations to save its financial
services reputation. Intel's selection of Ireland as the location
for its next generation semi-conductor facility is a further en-
dorsement of Ireland's "capabilities and competitiveness."215
"This new investment, which was won for Ireland against
fierce international competition, will bring the Intel Leixlip
site to the summit of manufacturing technology in the semi-
conductor sector globally and will make it the most advanced
wafer fabrication site in Europe."216 By taking rigorous mea-
sures now to preserve its place among reputable investment
locations, Ireland ensures itself a strengthened competitive
environment in the future which will prove increasingly impor-
tant with the introduction of the Euro and as Ireland becomes
more involved in the global economy.21
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Hamish McDonald, Celtic Tiger May Be in For a Pounding, SYDNEY MORN-
ING HERALD, Dec. 30, 1998, available at http'//property.smh.com.au/news/9812/30/
world/world6.html (last visited June 30, 2000). See also Meredith J. Coleman,
Comment, The Republic of Ireland's Economic Boom: Can the Emerald Isle Sustain
Its Exponential Growth?, 21 U. PA. J. INTL ECON. L. 833 (2000) (discussing the
factors leading to Ireland's economic boom).
213. See McDonald, supra note 212.
214. See Poyner, supra note 17, at 215.
215. Dept. of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, Intel to Create 1,000 New
Jobs in IDA, June 19, 2000, at http:J/www.entemp.ie:/pressrel/190600a.htm (last
visited June 21, 2000).
216. Id.
217. See SEANAD DEB. (Nov. 25, 1999), available at http:lwww/irlgov.ie:80/
debates99/s25nov99/sect4.htm; McDonald, supra note 212. The introduction of the
single currency will have a greater impact on Ireland than most other EU Mem-
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E. Reinsurance
A corollary to the tax and company laws Ireland enacted
to combat the IRNR problem in general, are new regulations
passed to deal specifically with fraudulent reinsurance compa-
nies.218 The Insurance Act, 1989 (Reinsurance) (Form of Noti-
fication) Regulations, 1999 are an added attempt to protect the
reputation of the IFSC as a high-quality international financial
center.219 Before 1999, the reinsurance sector had not been
regulated in Ireland, but because of increasing fraud surround-
ing certain reinsurance companies located in the IFSC, the
Irish government decided to take action.22° Regulation was
formerly unnecessary because the majority of reinsurance
companies registered in Ireland were subsidiaries of major
international reinsurance groups based in the IFSC which
meant that prior to registration each reinsurance company
went through a thorough screening process.22" ' These reinsur-
ance companies, therefore, generally contributed positively to
Ireland's international standing as a reputable financial servic-
es center.2 Some reinsurance companies operating exclu-
sively outside of Ireland, however, were not nurturing Ireland's
reputation but damaging it by their unscrupulous and fraudu-
lent activities.2" In fact, it was reported that as recently as
January 16, 2000, two reinsurance companies associated with
her States because the United Kingdom, Ireland's main European competitor, has
opted out of the monetary union for at least another three years. During this
period, fluctuations in the British pound will pose a threat to Ireland's competi-
tiveness and overall economic success. See McDonald, supra note 212.
218. See Dept. of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, Treacy Announces New
Measures to Protect the Reputation of the IFSC, Dec. 29, 1999, at
http://www.entemp.ie:80/pressrel/291299.htm; DAL DEB. (Feb. 29, 2000), available
at http:J/www/irlgov.ie:80/debates0O/29 feb/sectl6.htm; DAIL DEB. (Apr. 11, 2000),
available at httpA/www/irlgov.ie:80/debatesOO/llapril/sect4.htm (last visited Apr. 11,
2000). See also DEPT. OF ENTERPRISE, TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT, PRESENTATION TO
JOINT OIREACHTAS COMMVITEE ON ENTERPRISE AND SMALL BUSINESS ON THE DRAFT
INSURANCE BILL 1999 (Nov. 2, 1999), available at http:I/www.entempie:80/cr/
bilUo.htm (last visited June 21, 2000) [hereinafter Treacy Announces].
219. See id.
220. See DAIL DEB. (Apr. 11, 2000), available at httpJ/www/irlgov.ie:80/
debatesOO/llapril/sect4.htm; Dept. of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, supra
note 59.
221. See Treacy Announces, supra note 218.
222. See DAL DEB. (Feb. 9, 2000), available at http'.I/www/irlgov.ie/
oireachtaslframe.htm.
223. See id.
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the IFSC were under investigation by the Serious Fraud Office
in the United Kingdom.2"4
The new regulations not only require reinsurance compa-
nies to provide more detailed information before registering in
Ireland, but also reinforce the existing screening procedure of
reinsurance companies performed by the Department of Enter-
prise, Trade and Employment's insurance division. 5 In ef-
fect, the notification regulations are a first step towards bring-
ing reinsurance companies under the same authorization and
supervision procedures as insurance companies.2 6 As in its
tax and company law legislation, here too the Irish government
had to balance the need to protect the IFSC's financial services
reputation with the desire not to impose an undue regulatory
burden on industry." When announcing the new regula-
tions, the Minister of Science, Technology and Commerce, Mr.
Treacy, remarked that such measures only were taken after
"full consultation with the insurance industry." " "Protecting
the reputation of the IFSC," Mr. Treacy stated, "is the joint
responsibility of Government and Industry."
29
F. Provisions made for U.S. Multinational Corporations
In addition to the economic and political factors discussed
above, the legislature also considered the effect of its dual
legislation on U.S. multinational corporations (MNC). No doubt
the strong Irish economy acted as a springboard for the
government's two-prong attack on IRNRs, but it was not strong
enough for Ireland to completely eliminate the non-resident
company structure. Unlike the United Kingdom, Ireland did
not eliminate IRNRs entirely as many companies in its large
multinational sector use non-resident companies for legitimate
business activities."0 For economic policy reasons, such a
224. See DAIL DEB. (Apr. 11, 2000), available at http:/www/irlgov.ie:80/
debates00/llapril/sect4.htm.
225. See Treacy Announces, supra note 218.
226. See id.
227. See DAIL DEB. (Feb. 9, 2000), available at http'/www/irlgov.ie/oireachtas/
frame.htm; DAL DEB. (Apr. 11, 2000), available at http:/Iwww/irlgov.ie:80/
debates00/llapri/sect4.htm.
228. Treacy Announces, supra note 218.
229. Id.
230. See Craig, Ireland Finance Bill Begins Scaling Back Rate for Corporations,
Expands Benefits for Some, supra note 39.
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measure would be imprudent. As of 1997, multinational cor-
porations accounted for fifty-five percent of manufacturing
output and.forty-five percent of employment; three out of every
four jobs was indirectly attributed to foreign investment in Ire-
land." It is no surprise, therefore, that Ireland had a "vested
interest" in maintaining its burgeoning foreign business envi-
ronment;" 2 relying on foreign investment more than most
EU member states. 3 For these reasons, Ireland calibrated
its attack on IRNRs to take into account their positive effects,
such as job creation.' The fear was that too stringent a gov-
ernment response to the IRNR problem could result in a "baby
with the bath-water" effect. 5
Despite the significant presence of multinational corpora-
tions in Ireland, not everyone was convinced that Ireland
should risk the continued use of non-resident companies for
their benefit. One recent commentator said that there is no
benefit to the Irish economy from multinational corporations
using IRNRs for tax deferral purposes, except the fees paid to
accountancy and legal firms to set up IRNRs.235 This view-
point underscores the belief that since sufficient concessions
for multinational corporations already exist, MNCs with manu-
facturing operations in Ireland will not pull out simply because
IRNRs are abolished. 7 At the February 26, 1998 DAil De-
bates, legislator Derek McDowell listed numerous reasons,
other than tax-deferring IRNRs, why multinational corpora-
tions would want to locate in Ireland, including tax concessions
and a young, well trained, English-speaking workforce.238 In
addition, Mr. McDowell cited Ireland's location as a convenient
"foothold to the EU market" for U.S. multinational corpora-
tions. 9 Believing IRNRs are of little or no benefit to the
231. See Poyner, supra note 17, at 199.
232. Id.
233. See id. See also Coleman, supra note 212 (discussing Ireland's heavy de-
pendence on U.S. investment and the negative effects of such dependence should
the U.S. face an economic downturn).
234. See John Iekel, Controversy Erupts Over Abuse of Irish Tax Law, 16 TAX
NoTEs INVL 761 (1998).
235. Id.
236. See Brennock, supra note 37.
237. See id. DAIL DEB. (Feb. 26, 1998), available at http://www/irlgov.ie:80/
debates/26feb98/sect3.htm.
238. See DAIL DEB. (Feb. 26, 1998), available at http:j/www/irlgov.ie:80/ de-
bates26feb98/sect3.htm.
239. Id. "In the future, the use of a single European holding company for all
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Irish economy, Mr. McDowell asserted, "I do not see why we
should seek to facilitate [multinational corporations] further by
providing a company law structure which allows them to avoid
or defer the payment of tax in their home country."240 Even
Intel, a U.S. multinational corporation with 5,000 Irish em-
ployees, said it would "welcome" the abolition of IRNRs."4 In
1998, an Intel spokesperson stated that the company had "no
interest in the perception that Ireland is a location for any sort
of illegal activity." 2 Despite the force of this argument, this
reasoning is flawed as it fails to grasp the potentially far-
reaching implications eliminating IRNRs would have on future
inward investment. The potential for tax deferral by multina-
tional corporations is an attractive feature of doing business in
Ireland. Elimination of this incentive may not cause multina-
tional corporations with manufacturing operations in Ireland
to leave, but it may negatively impact Ireland's standing in fu-
ture investment location decisions made by MNCs.
T~naiste and Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employ-
ment, Mary Harney, on the other hand, stressed the impor-
tance of not placing any restrictions on MNCs which have
made such an "enormous contribution" to Ireland's economic
growth by investing in the economy and employing 50 percent
of the workforce in manufacturing and internationally traded
services."' Realizing the tension, however, between this goal
and combating the illegal use of IRNRs, Mary Harney followed
this statement by calling for the crippling of IRNRs' capacity to
facilitate illegitimate and criminal activities such as money
laundering.'
Many multinational corporations use IRNRs as a legiti-
mate vehicle to move their money.245 This type of company
structure enables MNCs doing business in Ireland to take their
foreign investments may become more prevalent because of potential advantageous
results under the European Union Directives." PRICEWATERHOUSE, IRELAND: A
GUIDE FOR THE US INVESTOR 84 (1997 ed.).
240. DAIL DEB. (Feb. 26, 1998), available at http'J/www/irlgov.ie:80/ de-
bates/26feb98/sect3.htm.
241. See Sean Mac Carthaigh, IDA Ireland says IRNRs are not Vital to Mul-
tinationals, IRISH TIMES, Feb. 27, 1998, at 7.
242. Id.
243. DAIL DEB. (Feb. 26, 1998), available at http'//www/irlgov.ie:80/de-
bates/26feb98/sect3.htm.
244. See id.
245. See id.
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profits out of Ireland and invest them elsewhere without pay-
ing tax again when they reinvest. 6 U.S. corporations, repre-
senting 40 percent of overseas companies operating in Ire-
land," benefit most from IRNRs. The U.S. tax deferral sys-
tem makes IRNRs a valuable tax planning tool for U.S. multi-
national corporations in large part because of the relatively
high Irish tax rates on passive income.,45 Historically, pas-
sive income 9 in Ireland has been taxed at rates up to 50
percent; the current rate being 28 percent.5 For this reason,
many U.S. corporations typically set up their Irish manufac-
turing operations using an IRNR managed and controlled ei-
ther in a tax haven country or in the United States."' Such
an arrangement allows Ireland to tax only income connected
with the Irish branch. 2 This leaves the surplus cash free to
be transferred to the head office, based either in a tax haven
country or the United States, from where it can be invested
free of Irish tax."'
Because U.S. corporations are subject to U.S. federal in-
come tax on their worldwide income,254 double taxation is
246. See id. "In Holland and Belgium companies use a holding company mecha-
nism and in other countries they use a participation privilege mechanism. By
virtue of that participation privilege they are prone to double taxation." Id.
247. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 1, at 6.
248. See Walsh, supra note 15.
249. Passive income, in this context, includes the investment of surplus funds.
See id.
250. See id. Note that the 1999 Finance Act sets forth a gradual schedule of
reductions on the passive income tax rate to 25 percent starting January 1, 2000.
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 1, at 41.
251. See Walsh, supra note 15.
252. See Poyner, supra note 17, at 213-14.
Irish tax law distinguishes between resident and non-resident com-
panies doing business in Ireland. A non-resident company is only liable
for the applicable corporation tax on income arising through that particu-
lar U.S. branch in Ireland. Branch offices of U.S. firms will most certain-
ly be classified as non-resident for purposes of determining Irish corpo-
rate tax liability and therefore not be subject to tax on worldwide profits.
In order for a corporation to be taxed as a resident of Ireland, the U.S.
parent company would likely have to make a conscious decision to base
its central control and management in Ireland. Therefore, there is little
danger that a U.S. corporation would inadvertently be classified as a
resident of Ireland for taxation purposes because, in most cases, the U.S.
corporation conducting Irish operations will reserve its management and
control over the entire corporation to the United States.
Id.
253. See Walsh, supra note 15.
254. See PRICEWATERHOUSE, IRELAND: A GUIDE FOR THE US INVESTOR 69 (1997
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usually circumvented by utilizing foreign income tax cred-
its." For example, if a U.S. multinational corporation formed
a foreign subsidiary to carry on Irish operations, generally the
subsidiary's income would not be subject to U.S. tax until it
was distributed as a dividend to its U.S. parent company.
26
In planning their overseas operations, therefore, U.S. corpora-
tions generally seek to defer foreign income from U.S. taxation
and adjust their average foreign tax rate according to all in-
come sources so as not to exceed their effective U.S. tax
rate. 7 For these reasons, it is no surprise that statistics
compiled by the United States Department of Commerce, in
1999, showed that for over a decade U.S. manufacturing opera-
tions in Ireland have averaged about a 25 percent after-tax
return on their investments.2 18 U.S. corporations' extensive
ed.). U.S. corporations are usually subject to federal income tax when such foreign
income is received or accrued. See id.
255. See id. Expense allocation rules and limits on separate classes of income,
however, may reduce the amount of creditable tax in the current year. See id. See
PRICEWATERHOUSE, IRELAND: A GUIDE FOR THE US INVESTOR 70-72 (1997 ed.) (for
additional information on foreign tax credits).
256. See i&L at 69-71. Note that there are exceptions to this general rule relat-
ing to controlled foreign corporations, passive foreign investment companies and
foreign personal holding companies. Id. See Appendix 1 of PRICEWATERHOUSE,
IRELAND: A GUIDE FOR THE US INVESTOR 103-120 (1997 ed.) (for examples of alter-
native Irish company structures).
257. See id. at 69.
Many U.S. multinationals which have existing manufacturing oper-
ations in high-tax foreign countries are in an excess foreign tax credit
position due to a number of factors, including the relatively high levels of
combined foreign income and withholding taxes and the U.S. expense
allocation rules which require foreign source income to be reduced by
certain U.S. deductions when computing the foreign tax credit limitation.
This excess credit position points to a need for U.S. companies to reduce
their foreign tax levels, wherever possible, and to generate more low-tax
foreign source income. This would indicate that foreign investment in
low-tax countries, such as Ireland, can particularly benefit U.S. investors.
Id. at 72. To comply with EU state aid rules, the 1999 Finance Act gradually
phases out Ireland's 10 percent corporation tax rate for manufacturing and inter-
national services activities, so that by January 1, 2003 it will largely be replaced
by a corporation tax rate of 12.5 percent for active income and 25 percent for
passive income. The 12.5 percent tax rate will apply to active income from all
operations; it will not be restricted to manufacturing, international services or
financial service companies, thus creating new opportunities for overseas companies
in Ireland that previously would not have qualified for the 10 percent tax rate.
See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 1 at 41. See
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, TAX FACTS 1999/2000 13 (1999), for a discussion of the
standard rate of corporation tax and the 10 percent rate of corporation tax.
258. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 1, at 12. See table in
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use of IRNRs and Ireland's desire to protect this valuable tax
planning tool for inbound investors explains the need for a
complex solution to the IRNR problem rather than a simple
elimination of this company structure.25"
G. Repercussions of the Two-Prong Attack
Considering the breadth and complexity of the 1999 Fi-
nance Act and Companies (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, the transi-
tion period-less than eight months-may not be enough time for
IRNRs to take the necessary measures to comply with the new
legislation, including liquidation of assets where appropri-
ate.26 In 1988, when the United Kingdom passed legislation
eliminating non-resident companies, it provided a five year
phase-out period for existing companies.261 Ireland's decision
to allow only a short transition period underscores their eager-
ness to tackle the illegal abuse of IRNRs head on; without
giving fraudsters in the system time to work around the new
legislation. One consequence of the short transition period is
that many IRNRs will seek to establish small-scale trading
activities in Ireland in order to qualify under the exception
provided in section 23A(3) of the 1999 Finance Act.262 In this
way, companies can secure time to reorganize their affairs in
an orderly fashion.263 Another possible alternative for compa-
nies unable to complete liquidation within the transition period
is migration to a treaty country with a tiebreaker clause.2"
On an immediate and practical level, many IRNRs have al-
ready gone into voluntary liquidation in order to circumvent
the 1999 Finance Act's tax and reporting requirements. 5
Along with the criticism surrounding the short transition
period, a new measure under the Money Laundering Provi-
sions of the Criminal Justice Act 1994 also has been pro-
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, DOING BusINEss AND INVESTING IN IRELAND 12 (1999),
for a comparison of U.S. manufacturing operations in Ireland and with those in
other European countries.
259. See Walsh, supra note 15.
260. See Kilcullen, supra note 7; Walsh, supra note 15, at 714.
261. See Kilcullen, supra note 7.
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See Walsh, supra note 15, at 714.
265. See Company Liquidations Rise by 23%, IRISH TIMES, Dec. 22, 1999, at
C17.
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posed.266 In essence, such a measure would bring company
formation agents and accountancy firms within the money
laundering provisions by imposing on them a "know your cli-
ent" requirement and subsequently obliging them to declare
the identity of the IRNR's beneficial owner.2"7 This proposal
also calls for more general examination of financial account
records in cases where tax evasion is suspected.268 In the
past, Revenue was not given such powers because as a periph-
ery EU country, Ireland feared the flight of capital from its
economy if regulations were too strict.269 As proven by
Ireland's 1999 legislation, Ireland must no longer shy away
from stringent regulation because of economic fears. In fact,
Ireland's strong financial position would enable it to pass more
regulations to combat any continued illegal activity but it is
not clear whether additional measures will be either necessary
or useful. Upon review, the Department of Justice, Equality
and Law Reform commented that because of the "once-off na-
ture of transactions" performed by company formation agents,
it would be difficult for them to form a reasonable suspicion of
money laundering by their clients.' Additionally, the De-
partment of Justice, Equality and Law Reform remarked that
the amount of money involved in setting up an IRNR is trivial;
consisting of merely the Registrar of Companies' fee and the
agent's fee.2 ' Furthermore, the person setting up the IRNR
would not have started to use the company to conduct business
yet, thus there would be no basis upon which a company for-
mation agent could form a suspicion.2 On the other hand,
Nigel Morris-Cotterill, a British expert on money laundering,
criticizes the way Irish money laundering regulations are in-
terpreted, stating that there is no clear understanding of who
is affected by the laws.' Mr. Morris-Cotterill emphasizes
that money laundering is a crime and that financial institu-
tions should face penalties for not taking steps to prevent
266. See IRISH TwIES, supra note 6.
267. See Creaton, supra note 42.
268. See Jane Suiter, Wider Revenue Powers to Tackle Fraudsters, IRISH TIMES,
Feb. 6, 1999, at 18.
269. See id.
270. Dept. of Finance, supra note 80.
271. See id.
272. See id.
273. See Suiter, supra note 68.
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themselves from being used to facilitate this type of criminal
activity. 4 "Where the authorities cannot catch the person
committing the underlying crime, there is an increasing ten-
dency to follow the money and prosecute those who
helped."275 It is this tendency, or perhaps a lack of confidence
in the new tax and company law amendments, that is driving
the proposal for a money laundering provision.
Although advocates for the money laundering provision
question the effectiveness of Ireland's two-prong legislative
attack, in the final analysis these measures, which tighten up
Ireland's tax and company law structures, will be effective
because they significantly detract from Ireland's attractiveness
as a location for corrupt non-resident companies.' To be
sure, Ireland's apparent accomplishment of purging the Emer-
ald Isle of corrupt IRNRs does not signal the end of such nefar-
ious activities elsewhere.277 In 1998, James Brannam, chair-
man of the Sark Association of Corporate Administrators and
then director of approximately 100 IRNRs, predicted such a
scenario when he suggested that stricter Irish regulations
would prompt most IRNRs to migrate to a more "relaxed juris-
diction."278 In essence, money laundering and other criminal
operations facilitated by lax company structures will continue
to exist but those companies previously using Irish incorpora-
tion as a "veneer of respectability" for their fraudulent activi-
ties will be forced to relocate to less regulated jurisdictions.279
IV. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, Ireland's 1999 legislation will "go down in
history" inasmuch as it establishes the framework for Ireland's
tax and company law regime for the millennium.28 "While
the U.S. frets over tax avoidance, the Irish have taken the bull
by the horns" in order to eliminate IRNRs threatening their
reputation as a well-regulated financial center.28" ' The lessons
274. See id.
275. Id.
276. See McNally, supra note 50.
277. See id.
278. Creaton, supra note 42.
279. Mary Canniffe, Bill will Force Registered Firms into Ta: Net, IRISH TIMES,
Feb. 27, 1998, at 7; Creaton, supra note 42.
280. Faughnan, supra note 45.
281. Medori, supra note 92.
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learned from the 1995 Finance Act proved that a mere tighten-
ing of the tax provisions was not enough to rid Ireland of those
foreign investors taking advantage of its lax tax and company
laws. Ireland knew, therefore, that in order to effectively com-
bat the illegal use of IRNRs it had to wage a two-front attack.
The introduction of a second legislative prong, namely amend-
ments to the company law, meant that the Irish government
finally had a mechanism to enforce violations.
By attacking the IRNR problem head on, Ireland has se-
cured its place among reputable financial centers worldwide.
Eventually, Ireland's economy will mature enough to enable it
to completely eliminate IRNRs. Until then, its two-prong legis-
lative attack will maintain Ireland's position as a favored in-
vestment location in Europe. The complex provisions of the
dual legislation ensure that the non-resident company struc-
ture in Ireland will serve as an incentive for foreign invest-
ment in the future rather than a facilitator of criminal activity.
Furthermore, the sensitivity of the 1999 legislation to the con-
flicting needs of the Irish economy-the need to protect its fi-
nancial services reputation as well as its foreign investment
incentives-enabled Ireland to strike a delicate balance in re-
structuring its tax and company law regime. In essence,
Ireland's successful balancing of reputation and foreign invest-
ment incentives sets the stage for its place among other ma-
ture economies in the global market in the years to come.
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